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Spatial and historical determinants
of
separatism and integration
1. Qualitative analysis
Bertrand M. Roehner1
Institute for Theoretical and High Energy Physics, University of Paris 6
Abstract Separatism is examined in a long-run perspective. Accordingly, many political or eco-
nomic factors which may be crucial in dealing with short-term episodes can be safely disregarded.
Extending an approach pioneered by J. Jenkins, the paper assesses the role of spatial and historical
factors. It shows that the means used to stage a separatist struggle are to a notable extent borrowed
from former historical episodes, an analysis which supports and illustrates C. Tilly’s thesis of re-
stricted repertoires of action. The purpose of the present paper is to introduce the model, to make it
plausible and to demonstrate its potential usefulness by examining a number of critical examples. A
more systematic analysis is carried out in a follow-up paper by using a data set that includes about 40
cases of separatist struggles.
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2“The people are the land , and the land is the people.”
Fijian proverb, cited in Robie (1989)
“Language is the essence of human existence.”
Maori proverb, cited in Fleras et al (1992)
“To speak the same language as one’s neighbours ex-
press solidarity with those neighbours; to speak a dif-
ferent language from one’s neighbours expresses so-
cial distance or even hostility”
Leach (1954)
Introduction
In the introduction of “Language and ethnic relations in Canada” Stanley Lieber-
son pointed out that “the book stems from a curiosity about why groups in contact
maintain their distinctive languages over the centuries in some countries, but else-
where give up their native tongues in a few generations”. This question is at the
heart of the present paper. What makes it perhaps even more important in the late
twentieth century is the following observation. Throughout the twentieth century the
number of sovereign countries has grown steadily, at first slowly and then, after the
Second World War, more and more rapidly (Figure 1). The current trend sharply
contrasts with the evolution during the nineteenth century. Although the latter has
been referred to as the century of nationalities, a significant fall in the number of
sovereign states occurred between 1850 and 1900, mainly as a result of the forma-
tion of the German Empire. The obvious question then is whether in a long term per-
spective the current trend will continue or whether a new coalescence cycle may set
in1. True, especially between 1950 and 1970, the decolonization process accounted
for the emergence of a great number of independent states. Yet, a substantial num-
ber of new sovereign states came into being through the disintegration of former
federations. While being the most obvious illustration, the case2 of the USSR (Dec
1991) is not the only example; the secession of Iceland from Denmark (1944), of
Bangladesh from Pakistan (1971), of Somaliland from Somalia (1991) and the scis-
sion of Czechoslovakia (January 1993) are other well known examples. Furthermore,
given the number of separatist movements that are currently in progress, there is a
substantial probability that the number of sovereign states will continue to increase
in the near future. Surprisingly enough, while the trend in the political sphere has
1Such a question is in fact beyond the scope of the present paper; it requires a dynamic model whereas the one
developed here is a static, equilibrium model.
2Although the term “disintegration” is commonly used, in fact it was rather an ordely separation in the sense that the
Republics which became independent (one can remember that Ukraine had already been one of the founding members
of the United Nations) had the constitutional right to do so, whereas those which, like the Chechen Republic, did not
have that right remained in the Federation. One must recognize that the fact that the two types of entities were called
“Republic” (albeit of different kinds) does not help to understand this distinction.
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Figure 1 Evolution in the number of independent states. The huge decrease that occurred in the first half
of the nineteenth century was mainly due to the progressive unification of Germany. In 1803 there were about
500 sovereign or autonomous kingdoms, bishoprics and other ecclesiastical territories; a first step was the
dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806; in 1833 there were still 31 German states. The independence
of India in 1947 occurred simultaneously with the disappearance of about 140 local kingdoms and principalities;
it is unclear to what extent these entities could be considered as really independent within British India which
is why they were not taken into account in the present chart. Sources: Statesman’s Year-Book (various years);
Passant (1960); Quid (1997); U.N. information leaflet about membership and admission dates.
been toward a greater degree of autonomy and federalism, in the economic sphere
there has been a general drift toward greater centralization.
There is already a vast literature on integration factors and on separatist movements;
a short review is given in section 2. In general terms the two distinctive features of
the present paper are the following.
(1) The paper examines the long-term effect of spatial factors. Only little attention
has so far been given to the spatial determinants of separatism, a notable exception
being the work of Jenkins (1986) about Jura separatism in Switzerland. His conclu-
sion is worth quoting for it provides so to say the starting point for the present study:
“This work concludes that two geographical variables, the physical geography of
the Bernese Jura and distance were fundamental during the period of approximately
nineteen century following the birth of Christ in developing a distinctive identity for
the region which became the Bernese Jura in 1815”. What tends to hide the impact
of spatial factors is the fact that in short intervals (10 or 20 years) the role played by
4economic, cultural and political factors is so conspicuous that it tends to blur the slow
but steady influence of geographical factors. Furthermore, the latter do not usually
give rise to many spectacular events, a circumstance which makes them even less
visible. They operate at microhistorical rather than at macrohistorical level. Even a
life-time may be too short a period to observe any significant effect of geographical
factors; it is their steadiness which makes them important. Political and economic
factors may change, but geographical conditions remain invariable. For instance, in
the 19th century the French-speaking part of Belgium was economically the leading
province; unemployment was on average much higher in Flanders. By the end of
the 20th century the situation is reversed. In contrast, an island remains an island, a
peninsula remains a peninsula3.
(2) Our approach is very much in line with the approaches of Connor (1972),
Lieberson (1970,1975) and Tilly (1986,1993). More specifically, it owes much to
Connor’s emphasis on historical factors; it relies on Lieberson’s analysis of language
and demographic determinants; and at the methodological level our strategy in im-
plementing events analysis follows rather closely the methods pioneered by Tilly and
Olzak (1992).
(3) Our primary objective is to confront our model with empirical quantitative
evidence. It is chiefly for the purpose of testability that our model uses only a small
number of parameters. In so doing we do not wish to deny that other causes are
present. Many ethnic, cultural or political factors are left aside, not because they
are unimportant but because it would be difficult to include them in a comparative
analysis based on quantitative data. While being probably unacceptable in a short-
term perspective, such a drastic selection is less questionable in a long-run analysis.
Presentation of the model’s main orientations
There are two rather distinct part in this study. Our objectives in the first part are
(i) To delineate the scope of the model by distinguishing those phenomena to which
it applies and those which are outside its field of applicability (ii) To motivate our
selection of the model’s parameters by a number of arguments. In so doing, we fre-
quently proceed by way of illustrations and examples; our aim is to suggest rather
than to prove. Although these examples could possibly be omitted in a more for-
mal presentation of the model, they are intended to emphasize its empirical roots.
Illustrations cannot replace statistical tests however; the latter are provided in the
second part of the study where the model is confronted with a fairly systematic body
of empirical evidence.
3Man-made transportation means may of course play a role; yet the effect of such agencies is very slow in general.
With a tunnel under the English Channel, Britain is “less” an island than before. Howeveror, for the time being, , the fare
is about the same whether one takes the tunnel or a ferry.
5The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the properties and the implications
of what could be called the blend of language and homeland. The last term refers
to a territorial base which has been occupied for a “long time” by a people. The
importance of these elements is obvious: language is the medium of communication
and, especially in rural societies, there is a strong connection between a people and
its homeland . As a matter of illustration let us consider the example of the United
States versus Switzerland. Both countries have a federal organization; yet, in terms
of integration they turn out to be very different. The linguistic frontier of the two
main components of the Swiss confederation, the French- and the German-speaking
peoples, have remained practically unchanged for centuries. As will be shown sub-
sequently the linguistic frontier is also a very effective barrier to domestic migration;
even worse, opinions on major political issues such as the European construction
are largely determined by language subdivisions. In short, integration seems to have
made little progress. The situation is completely different in the United States. In
order to emphasize how strongly many American national subgroups tried their best
to preserve their mother tongue, it is perhaps of some interest to recall the following
quotes.
“Few of their children learn English. Of the six printing houses in the province
[Pennsylvania], two are entirely German, two half German-half English. They have
one German newspaper. The signs on the street have inscriptions in both languages.”[In
1787 German Americans represented about 9 percent of total population.]
Letter of B. Franklin to a British Member of Parliament, May 9, 1753; cited in
Crawford (1992).
“In 1840 parents in Cincinnati demanded and obtained bilingual education for their
children. Not only in Cincinnati, but in many communities in the latter half of the
19th century, education using the native tongue of the non-English-speaking immi-
grants florished.”
Thernstrom (1980,p.619)
“By 1914 the National German American Alliance had an impressive membership
of approximately two million people. At that time the German American press in-
cluded over 500 German-language publications. In 1918 over 7,000 enemy aliens
were arrested by the Justice Department, many of them German Americans. Of the
200 German-language publications that survived World War I, only 24 remained in
1976.”
Thernstrom (1980,p.685)
These few facts remind us that the attachment of the German community to its lan-
6guage and to its “Vaterland” did not disappear easily. At the same time it shows the
strength of an integration process that was able to overcome the nationalist feelings
not only of the Germans but of many other peoples who were no less attached to
their language and to their homeland. Why did the melting-pot process work in the
American case and not at all in the Swiss case? Many specific reasons certainly can
and have been invoked to explain that particular case. In this paper we are rather
interested in general factors, that is to say causes which can be shown to be at work
in a large variety of similar situations. In that spirit one may mention the following
differences:
(1) The linguistic border between American Germans and the rest of the popu-
lation was of much greater length than in the case of Switzerland, the main reason
being that the area covered by American Germans was made up of several small
domains; in Switzerland on the contrary it formed (more or less) one domain4.
(2) The American German community always represented a small share (less than
15 percent) of the total American population; in contrast the Swiss French-speaking
community accounted for 20 to 30 percent of the Swiss population.
(3) Finally one may mention an historical reason. The time interval between emi-
gration and assimilation was to short for American Germans to constitute a homeland
in the United States. On the contrary in the case of Switzerland there was plenty of
time for the cement between homeland and language to set hard.
The above example suggests three factors of significance:
(1) The length of the linguistic frontier (along with its width, see below)
(2) The relative proportion of the subgroup in the total population.
(3) The degree of identification a people has established in the course of history
with its territorial base.
We posit that these factors account for a large number of separatist movements in
industrialized as well as in developing countries. The influence of the mobilization
parameter which has been thoroughly studied, in particular by K. Deutsch, is rep-
resented in our model by the width of the linguistic frontier. One should note that
the model does not apply to minorities characterized by non-linguistic ethnic fac-
tors. Thus, for instance, the following minorities fall outside the scope of the model:
Mormons, Hutterites, Jews and in general all religious minorities (the question of the
respective roles of religion and language is discussed below), Blacks in the Unites
States, Burakumins in Japan, etc.
Methodological preparation
4In mathematical terms, the first domain would be referred to as a multiply connected domain, while the second
domain is said to be simply connected.
7Short survey of the literature
Although there is a vast literature on national integration and separatist movements,
the studies focusing on the bond between mother tongue and homeland are not so
numerous. It it is hardly possible in the framework of this paper to give an account
of the various models that have been proposed: comprehensive and very readable
reviews are to be found in Connor (1994) and Premdas (1990) for instance. In this
paragraph we propose a classification of recent contributions according to the kind
and extent of the empirical evidence with which the models have been confronted. It
is possible to distinguish four categories in that respect.
(1) Purely theoretical models, i.e. models which have not yet been confronted
with any piece of empirical evidence.
(2) Models that have been confronted with qualitative evidence.
(3) Models that have been confronted with a limited amount of quantitative evi-
dence.
(4) Models that have been confronted with extensive statistical evidence.
Three contributions in the last category will be discussed specifically because of their
direct connection with the models developed in this paper.
Lieberson et al. (1975) This pioneering study examines the determinants of
mother tongue diversity. It analyzes the evolution of language diversity in 35 states
and over periods ranging from a century to a few years, depending on data availabil-
ity. Various national characteristics are considered in relation to changes in language
diversity. Two factors, the spatial isolation of language groups and official educa-
tional policies turn out to have a significant influence on language diversity. Spatial
isolation was estimated through an index proposed by Bell (1954). In a sense, given
the reliance on indexes and aggregated figures it can be said that the analysis by
Lieberson et al. considered the problem in a macrosociological perspective. In con-
trast, through its emphasis on basic mechanisms, the present paper rather presents a
microsociological view.
Allardt (1979) This short book analyzes 46 linguistic minorities in Western Eu-
rope, ranging from large subgroups such as the Catalans (5.7 million) to small mi-
norities such as the Faroe islanders (46,000). As many as 18 variables are considered
describing the minorities in various aspects: demography, education, welfare, poli-
tics, etc, but little attention is given to the historical background. Cross-correlations
for all variables are systematically computed; most correlations turn out to be too
small to be significant; yet, more embarrassing is the fact that no clear pattern seems
to emerge from the few cross-correlations which are high enough to be significant.
8Gurr (1993) Ted Gurr’s analysis of communal mobilization relies on an impres-
sive and unique statistical data base. Basic characteristics (population, ethnic clas-
sification, etc) are provided for 227 communal groups. It covers a the whole period
from Second World War to present. The statistical inquiry which we develop in the
second part of this study in many respects follows Gurr’s approach. One marked
difference is that Gurr does not restrict his study to minorities with a definite terri-
torial base: religious minorities (Jews in Argentina for instance) or ethnic minorities
(foreign workers in Switzerland for instance) are considered along with regional mi-
norities. The task of modeling such a large class of minorities is probably even more
complex than the one we take up in this paper.
“Doable versus undoable questions”
The distinction between so-called “doable” and “undoable” questions has been put
forward by S. Lieberson (1985). We believe it to be very important. For policy
purposes one would want to predict the outcome of separatist struggles that are cur-
rently in progress or to identify those that are likely to erupt in the future. These,
however, are very difficult problems. An analogy proposed by S. Lieberson (1985,
p.97) makes the matter very clear. “Suppose I wish to find out the factors that lead
a small number of people to reach stardom in motion pictures. It might well be pos-
sible to find certain characteristics of the individuals which affect their chances, for
instance personal attractiveness, persistence, connections, even acting talent. Efforts
to go beyond the establishment of probability functions for each type of characteris-
tics are doomed to failure. Sure, every special case could in a sense be ‘explained’;
but the relevance of such ad hoc, a posteriori reasoning is doubtful”. In the same way
as the achievement of stardom, the emergence or the success of a separatist struggle
sequentially depends upon a large number of special circumstances. For instance
even a charismatic leader is unable to play any political role unless the state has been
compelled (usually by some external pressure) to renounce to ruthless repression5.
Thus, trying to answer questions of interest for policy purposes would probably make
us waste time and energy on “undoable” questions. What is worse, it could lead us
to disregard, as being of little interest, precisely those questions that may be settled
conclusively.
For those who dislike analogies the above argument can be presented in a different,
more mathematical way. Basically, separatist struggles are transient, non-equilibrium
episodes. Roughly speaking one may say that there are two opposite forces at work:
a tendency to centralization on one hand and an aspiration to liberty, autonomy and
5A spectacular example of such a relentless repression is given by the suppression of the rebellion in East-Timor
between 1976 and 1988.
9independence on the other hand. So long as one factor checks the other there is an
equilibrium and no change is to be expected. For instance the Peruvian or the Mexi-
can Indians have remained for decades under the yoke of the landlords, the army or
other paramilitary groups; possible troubles remained confined to individual villages,
no collective consciousness came into being except perhaps under some special cir-
cumstances which lead to short-lived outbursts. On the other end of the spectrum
is the case of a completely autonomous region; the people then is no longer subject
to any coercive control by an alien state. The Finish Aland Islands are a possible
illustration. The move from one extreme to the other represents a transient process;
transient does not mean it should necessarily be short; the move may take several
centuries (as in the case of Ireland) but a new equilibrium will be reached only af-
ter this process is completed. Now, it well known that non-equilibrium problems
are more difficult to model than static situations; see in this respect Herbert Simon’s
celebrated bowl metaphor (Simon 1959). Because the “characteristic times” of in-
tegration phenomena are very long (with a magnitude of several centuries) it would
be desirable to perform time averages over a period of the same magnitude. For lack
of adequate data bases this will not be possible however, and we shall be content
with time averages covering the last fifty years. Under such conditions it will some-
times be difficult to distinguish between quasi-equilibrium situations and transient
fluctuations.
Spatial factors
The model
No better description can be given of what we shall for short call Coupland’s dif-
fusion effect than the following excerpt (Coupland 1954): “Few Englishmen want
to anglicise Wales, but the pressure exerted by the mighty neighbourhood to absorb
the Welsh into the English way of life is no less powerful because it is unconscious.
The age-long invasion never ceases; more and more English tourists are haunting the
mountains and the coasts of Wales. Aided by the motor-car they penetrate to those
districts where Welsh life has hitherto been least affected by English contact.”
Fig.2 schematically represents the regions in six different countries where there have
been active autonomist movements between 1965 and 1995. Their localization com-
forts the indications provided by the Switzerland/United States comparison in sec-
tion 1. Indeed all the regions are located at the periphery of the countries in a way
which minimize the length of the borderline with the rest of the country: two regions
are islands (Corsica and Ulster), three are peninsula (Brittany, Scotland, Wales), five
are in contact with communities which share the same minority language (Alsace,
10
Figure 2 Areas with autonomist movements in 6 countries. As a rule these areas are remote from the core
of the country and have minimal spatial contact with it.Very often they are part of a linguistic entity straddling
the national borderline. For the Canadian Province of New Brunswick, the map shows the zones where the
proportion of French-speaking people is higher than 75%. Source: For New Brunswick, Verneix (1979).
Catalonia, Basque Country, Southern Malay province of Thailand, French-speaking
areas in Canada’s Maritime Provinces, Chiapas state in Mexico). Together with the
other observations made in section 1 this leads us to posit the following hypothesis.
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The spatial determinants of separatist tendencies in a minority which occupies
an aream in a countryC can be summarized by the following spatial integration
factor:
Ds = p/lw (1)
where:
• p denotes the population of the minority (in proportion to total population).
• l denotes the length of the borderline between m and C
• w is a phenomenological parameter representing the facility of exchanges
across the regional borderline.
Some additional explanations are required regarding the evaluations of l and w.
Evaluation of l In the case of Wales, Scotland and Brittany, l is simply the length
of the borderline with the rest of Great Britain or France. But how should we take
into account the border between Alsace and Germany for instance. The local di-
alect in Alsace is a German dialect very similar to the one spoken in Baden. Hence
Coupland’s diffusion argument applies: Alsatians are able to receive German TV
programs, many work in Germany, etc. The contact between Alsace and Germany
therefore counters the French influence; consequently that part of the border should
be counted negatively. The same reasoning holds for the French Basque Country, the
south of Thailand or for the American Mexicans living in the vicinity of the Mexican
border. The rule for the evaluation of l may be stated in the following form:
The length of the borderline with a region sharing the language of the minority
should be subtracted from the length of the borderline with the rest of the coun-
try; the corresponding factors w1 and w2 describe the relative strength of both
diffusion processes.
A further comment is in order regarding islands. Clearly it would be inadequate to
take l as being equal to zero; in the case of Corsica for instance that would mean that
there are no privileged connections between Corsican ports and French ports such
as Marseilles or Nice which is clearly not true. We shall in such cases take for l a
conventional length which represents the density of sea- and air- routes between the
island and the mainland. More technical details are provided in the second paper.
Evaluation of w In our model w is a phenomenological parameter which can be
roughly estimated. Broadly speaking it represents the effectiveness of transportation
and communication means6. In other words w reflects the degree of mobilization in
a given society. For the sake of simplicity we shall restrict ourselves to the following
three-level scale:
6Here is an example: in 1880 it took 11 hours to go from Paris to Strasbourg (500 kilometers) by train; in 1980 it took
only 4 hours; in 2010, thanks to a new high speed train it took only 2 hours and a half.
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(1) w = 1 for “traditional” economies; examples: borderline between Biafra and
Nigeria or between West and East Timor.
(2) w = 2 for rural economies; example: borderline between Thailand and its
southern Malay (Muslim) province.
(3) w = 3 for industrialized countries; example: borderline between Quebec and
the rest of Canada.
Application to the comparison: Switzerland/United States.
By way of illustration let us apply our previous definitions to the comparison of the
process of integration in the United States and in Switzerland that we already dis-
cussed in section 1. The parameter w is the same for both countries and it can there-
fore be dropped for the purpose of comparison. In the case of Switzerland l and p
have remained almost unchanged during the last centuries: l ≃ 200 km, p = 20%.
On the contrary in the United States, the situation of the people of German ancestry
has changed drastically in the course of time; therefore a specific date has to be se-
lected for the evaluation of the spatial integration factor Ds; let us take 1900. The
exact geographical repartition of the American Germans is not known (most certainly
it would show a fractal pattern); this does not matter however for an educated guess
is sufficient for our purpose. The American German community numbered about 14
million (this figure has been extrapolated from the proportion of people of German
ancestry given in subsequent censuses); this leads to p = 15% . Let us consider that,
being mainly an urban population, it was distributed in urban groups of about 50,000
people; this gives about 320 groups. Let us consider that the density in such cities
was of the order of 2,500 inhabitants per square kilometer. The length of the border-
line of one group with the rest of the country thus turns out to be equal to 15.8 km
and for the total borderline we get: l = 320× 15.8 = 5, 056 km. As a consequence
we get the following integration factor:
USA (1900) Switzerland
German-speaking Americans French-speaking Swiss
Spatial integration factor(Ds) 25, 000 600
Thus, the integration pressure thus was 42 times larger in America than in Switzer-
land, an observation which is of course consistent with subsequent evolution. To
conclude our demonstration it remains to document our assertion about the poor
level of integration in Switzerland. Two important elements are provided in Fig.3.
The first one shows that there is a very small residential mobility between the French-
and the German-speaking parts; the second shows that there is a major fracture be-
tween the two regions regarding a problem of cardinal importance for the future of
the country. One could add that the French- and Italian-speaking minorities are under
13
Figure 3 Linguistic compartmentalization versus migration and political choices. The map on the left-
hand side shows the linguistic zones in Switzerland (1980). The map in the upper right corner shows the net
migration between different so-called employment regions 1975–1980. The conclusion which can be drawn is
that there are no substantial migration flows across linguistic frontiers. The map in the lower right corner shows
the results by canton of the referendum of 6 December 1992 on the project of European Union membership. A
majority of voters in the hatched zone voted yes; the results closely followed linguistic subdivisions. A more
precise analysis would require electoral results at the communal rather than at the cantonal level, especially
for Valais (which is French-speaking in the proportion of 60 percent). Sources: Bassand et al. (1985), Jenkins
(1986), Racine (1994).
represented at the level of the high federal administration:
Percentage of the minority Percentage in the
in total population high federal administration
French-speaking minority 20% 12.5%
Italian-speaking minority 6% 2.7%
Sources: Gazette de Lausanne (June 6, 1955); Le Monde (May 29, 1978)
Moreover, in the German-speaking part of Switzerland the usage of Swiss-German,
once restricted to domestic and casual communication, is becoming more and more
widespread even for instance in the classroom or in advertisements. As a result, a
French- or Italian-speaking Swiss would have to learn three languages in addition to
his own mother tongue, namely: English (imperative in the present world), German
and Swiss-German. This is a very demanding task and it is doubtful that it could be
14
carried out successfully by a large proportion of the population.
Discussion of apparent counter-examples
Before examining to what extent the previous model is supported by statistical evi-
dence, it is perhaps worthwhile to discuss what could seem to be obvious counter-
examples.
The American Civil War The most spectacular case is the American Civil War.
In French it is referred to as the “Guerre de Se´cession” [Secessionist war] but was it
really a secessionist struggle of the kind considered in this paper? One element, the
attachment to a land that has been occupied for generations, was certainly present
in the South. Yet, neither language nor religion was much of an issue. In other
words we have here the worrying situation of an allegedly separatist struggle of first
magnitude (600,000 deaths, Richardson 1960) that seems to fall outside the scope of
our model. Our contention is that it was not a separatist struggle of the kind analyzed
in this paper; The matter would certainly deserve a detailed discussion in its own; let
us here restrict ourselves to the following, schematic arguments.
(1) In an ethnic conflict defeat does not mark the end of the struggle. A compar-
ison with other wars that occurred at about the same time will illustrate the point.
In 1830 the first Polish rebellion was suppressed without mercy (16,000 deaths); in
1848-1849 the Hungarian uprising met the same fate (1,500 deaths). Yet, both the
Polish and the Hungarian engaged in other attempts until eventually they won their
independence.
(2) How then, if it was not a separatist struggle, should the American Civil War
be categorized? It was the last fight of a minority (5.5 million against 22 million)
for the defense of its way of life and its political autonomy; in other words it was a
war for political leadership, not for ethnic survival. More or less of the same type are
the wars of Vende´e in Revolutionary France or the war between Bavaria (allied to
Austria and other German states) against Prussia (1866); the latter can be considered
as the last feat7 of a sovereign nation before accepting its absorption in a larger entity.
Incidentally, it can be noted that the magnitudes of the respective populations were
about the same than for the American Civil War: Prussia: 20 million, Bavaria: 5
million.
The Amish The next example is more embarrassing. The Amish are a small
American community which has maintained its faith and its language (a German di-
alect) since the time they arrived in America in the 19th century. Let us first estimate
the magnitude of the integration factor for the Amish as compared to that for the
entire American German community: in 1900, if we assume that the Amish settled
7True, there have been other short-lived separatist attempts in Bavaria (1918,1923), but none that was of much conse-
quence.
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in urban communities of the same size as the average German Americans, we get
the same integration factor (indeed this factor turns out to be independent of the size
of the minority under consideration). In fact two corrections should be introduced:
firstly, given their rural way of life it is more reasonable to assume that the Amish
settled in smaller communities than other German Americans; this would result in a
larger integration factor than for German Americans; secondly, since the Amish con-
served their nineteenth century way of life (no cars, electricity, radio, or television)
the value of their mobilization factor w did not increase in the same way as that of
other American Germans; this would reduce the value of the integration factor, at
least for the twentieth century. By and large it is probably not unreasonable to admit
that these increase and decrease approximately cancel each other. Consequently, if
the integration factor is to be taken at its face value the Amish should have lost their
mother tongue in the same conditions as other American Germans. Yet, that did not
happen. Why?
Two elements of answer can be given.
(1) The Amish constitute a special case in the sense that they managed to establish
a strong and durable connection between their religion, their way of life and their
language. Not surprisingly, they had no difficulty in maintaining their faith, but
because of the close connection between their faith and their language the latter was
maintained too8.
(2) There is in fact a substantial emigration rate out of the Amish community; but
because of fairly high birth rates, this does not imperil the community’s future.
The integration process at parochial level
Why did social mobilization often stimulate nationalist feelings instead of curtailing
them? Such an observation has been made repeatedly (communal revivals inWestern
Europe are obvious examples) and it seemed to challenge K. Deutsch’s mobilization
thesis. This was all the more puzzling because the mobilization thesis had a firm,
clear and convincing basis at the microsociological level; how could increased inter-
action may have the effect of seemingly reducing integration? One explanation to
this paradox consists in distinguishing between several processes of integration tak-
ing place at different spatial levels. About one or two centuries ago a region of the
size of Brittany did not constitute a homogeneous ethnic entity. In the case of early
nineteenth century France, E. Weber (1976, p.45) notes that “the least of the village
considered itself a specific homeland in its language, legends, customs, ways”. He
shows persuasively that acute parochialism was a general “disease” in most French
8This “explanation” merely displaces the problem: why indeed did the Amish succeed in maintaining such a close
link between faith and language? The answer is not obvious. The Mormons for instance once tried to introduce a special
writing; but for all their organizational skills the tentative did not meet with much success and had eventually to be
abandoned.
16
provinces of that time. For instance real hostility existed between Lower and Upper
Brittany, a division based on the Celtic speech of the former and the French dialect
of the latter. Very often, either in Brittany or in other French provinces, local “wars”
broke out between different parishes that gave rise to real (albeit small) battles, most
of which did not leave any record in historical archives (see however the “Statis-
tiques du de´partement du Lot” 1831). Similarly in its systematic analysis of French
rebellions, C. Tilly (1986) came to the conclusion that “broadly speaking, the reper-
toire of the mid-seventeenth to mid-nineteenth centuries has a parochial scope. The
repertoire that crystallized in the nineteenth century and prevails today is, in gen-
eral, more national in scope.” In Ireland too the divergent interests of various clans
(the O’Rourke, the O’Donnel, etc) undermined any permanent coalition9. Thus, a
precondition for an effective nationalist struggle was the completion of a reasonable
degree of regional integration. This conclusion has been summarized in the follow-
ing way by C. Tilly in a recent work (1993): “During the 16th and 17th centuries
the effective units of collective action in Ireland consisted largely of patron-client
chains led by warlords. Only during the 19th century, as class-coalition and national
revolutions were generalizing elsewhere in Europe, do we see a popularization of the
Irish cause at a national level.” In short one of the keys to the solution of the problem
under consideration is the fact that (at least10 ) two integration processes were under
way simultaneously:
• a national integration which concerned the urban components of the society
• a regional integration which concerned rural areas, especially those with inade-
quate transportation networks.
Respective roles of religion and language loyalties
The spatial part of our model is specifically designed to account for the phenomenon
of languagemaintenance. This may seem to be a serious restriction. In fact, as will be
shown in this paragraph, this limitation is not so unmitigated as it could seem at first
sight. We shall argue that, before the twentieth century, religions very much played
the role languages have today in establishing national loyalties. Today, especially in
industrialized countries, the mechanisms of religion and language maintenance are
very different. Economic competition in the employment market produces a very
effective incentive to speak the language of the dominant majority. Nothing of the
sort exists for religions. As a result, as far as religions are concerned, the assimilation
rates are expected to be much lower than for languages, intermarriage being in this
case the main “assimilation” mechanism. Two or three centuries ago the situation
was completely different for the very definition of citizenship was based on religion.
9Even today, the nationalist fight of the Kurds is hampered by a chronical lack of solidarity between the different
ethnic components of the Kurdish people (Premdas et al, 1990.
10At the level of capital cities a third process of international integration could be mentioned
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This was not only true in Catholic or Muslim states, but also in those protestant states
such as Denmark, Great Britain or Sweden which are usually considered as having
been more tolerant in religious matters. Let us illustrate our proposition by three
examples:
• In 1709 when the Whigs gained a clear majority in Parliament they passed an
act that provided a simple procedure for the naturalization of foreigners. Aliens had
only to swear allegiance to the Crown, prove they had received a Protestant sacra-
ment in the preceeding three months and declare in open court against the doctrine of
transubstantiation. A similar law was enacted in 1740 for the purpose of permitting
foreigners in America to acquire subjectship (Thernstrom 1980). Similarly, by the
Test Act (1673), every civil servant had to declare against the doctrine of transubstan-
tiation (Mourre 1978, vol.1, p.246). It is in 1679 that the Catholics were explicitly
excluded from the Parliament. Reference to the Christian faith was maintained un-
til the late nineteenth century in the oath taken by members of the Parliament: it is
only in 1866 that the expression “upon the true faith of a Christian” has been deleted
(Doubnov 1933).
• In Denmark, the civil rights of the catholic minority had been severely cur-
tailed by successive laws enacted in 1613, 1624, 1643; they were confirmed and
strengthened by Christian V after his accession to the throne in 1660. In Sweden the
discrimination against catholics, introduced by Charles X, was extended by Charles
XI (1660-1697): conversion to the catholic religion was forbidden under pain of
banishment and deprivation of all possessions (Daniel-Rops 1958)
• Our last example concerns Germany; in the numerous little kingdoms that com-
posed Germany before 1870 the prevailing rule was “cujus regio, ejus religio” (the
religion of the sovereign determines the religion of the citizens).
One should also recall that education, which has become so important an issue in
modern societies, was closely connected with religion until the end of the nineteenth
century. One of the major purposes of elementary education was to be able to read
the Bible. This was particularly true in Protestant or Presbyterian regions. In the
case of Wales for instance, R. Coupland (1954) relates the remarkable development
of the so-called “Sunday schools”: “On Sunday the whole country was turned into
a religious school; hour after hour these Welsh folk sat listening to the reading of
the Bible and the geography of Palestine became more familiar to them than that of
Wales itself”.
A last confirmation of the shift from religions to languages issues can be gained
from the example of the Bernese Jura in Switzerland. Between 1830 and 1950 there
have been five major outbreaks: 1834, 1867, 1873, 1917, 1947. The first three had
religious mobiles, while the last two had linguistic causes; needless to say, the move-
ment that began after 1965 and lead eventually to the creation of a new canton was
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largely based on claims for linguistic rights.
Communal revivals in western industrialized societies may often be traced back to
the survivance of religious traditionalism. In such cases as Ireland or even Wales
the role played by religion is well known. Perhaps less known but quite as revealing
are the origins of regional revivals in France. The proportion of the people attending
Mass is notably higher than average in all the regions (the only exception being Cor-
sica) where there has been a communal revival (Isambert and Terrenoire 1980,p.30;
the figures refer to the period 1955-1962):
Alsace 84%
Basque Country 79%
Brittany 67%
National average 35%
Corsica 25%
In conclusion one may say that, seen in historical perspective, the lack of integra-
tion pressure regarding religious matters is a very recent innovation in industrialized
societies. In most developing countries religion still is a key factor in determining
social and professional loyalties; besides, there is probably a much greater resem-
blance between the mechanisms governing religion or language maintenance, than
may be suggested by the example of modern western societies.
Semi-quantitative tests
Official languages
It may be of interest to examine to what extent each sovereign country has its own
distinctive official language. At first glance it may seem that many nations share
one of the world’s dominant languages. To begin with, it should be noted that, in
contrast to an overwhelming majority of nations, neither the United States (at least
at the federal level) nor the United Kingdom have an official language. Furthermore,
the official language of many former colonies still remains the language of the former
colonizing power. In addition it is well known that many nations have Arabic as their
official language. In order to assess the extent of these effects one has to look at the
data in some detail. The results are summarized in Table 1 based on Banks (1995)
and the “Europa World Yearbook” (1995).
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Number of sovereign nations 193
Countries having at least one specific national language 92 48%
Former colonies (independent after 1945) 46
Countries having at least one specific national language 92/(193− 46) = 63%
(former colonies excluded)
Spanish as official language 15
Arabic as official language 17
Table 1: Official languages
It should be noted that there is a marked, albeit slow, tendency especially for former
colonies to adopt proper mother tongues as official languages. Examples are: India
(English is no longer an official language although it still has the status of an asso-
ciate language for many official purposes), Luxembourg (Letzeburgish,1982), Kenya
(Kiswahili,1974), Seychelles (Creole,1981).
Island states
The lack of integration can manifest itself in two ways: in the existence of regional
conflicts between a minority and a dominant majority, or in the existence of indepen-
dent states, the latter being the obvious outcome of successful separatist struggles.
In our model islands play a special role since, because of their minimal contacts with
neighboring nations,they are characterized by a particularly small integration factor.
A case study: the Aland islands Before we undertake a systematic analysis let
us first consider a special case, namely the Swedish minority in mainland Finland on
one hand and in the Aland islands (which belong to Finland) on the other hand. In
Finland a slow process of assimilation has been under way for decades as illustrated
by the following data giving the vote for the Swedish People Party (Svenska Folk-
partiet); the fall in the vote v can be modeled by: v = e−s/0.75 with s being expressed
in centuries:
1907 1917 1927 1936 1948 1958 1966 1979 1987
SPP (%) 12.7 10.9 12.2 11.2 7.7 6.7 6.0 4.6 5.3
1880 1950
Swedish-speaking people (%) 14.3 8.6
Table 2: Votes for the Swedish People Party and proportion of Swedish-speaking
people. Sources: Mackie and Rose (1982); Jansson (1961)
The situation is completely different in the Aland islands. Its population of about
21,000 is Swedish-speaking at 95 percent. Ceded to Russia in 1809, the Islands
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were returned to Finland by the League of Nations in 1921 despite calls by the is-
landers for reunification with Sweden. The islands have been demilitarized since
1856 and are neutralized since 1921. In exchange of the engagement of the Finnish
government to respect and preserve the Swedish language of the islanders Sweden
agreed to withdraw its claim to sovereignty over the islands. Since that time, the
islanders maintain a loyal attitude toward Finland but, in contrast with the mainland
Swedish-speaking minority, there has been no further progress of their integration in
the Finnish community.
Let us now examine the relationship between insularity and aspiration to sovereignty
in a more general way. In the case of an island, the separatism factor is particularly
high; accordingly one expects a large number of island-states. This effect should be
particularly marked for small states since there are only few large islands (of the size
of Britain or Japan for instance). In order to carry out our test we selected a threshold
area of 14,000 square kilometer. While being of course somewhat arbitrary, this limit
roughly corresponds to the category of what may be called “small countries”; as a
matter of comparison, Belgium has an area of 11,778 square kilometer and Lebanon
of 10,452 square kilometer. At first sight, especially from an European perspective,
our conjecture may be found to be wrong; there are indeed quite a large number of
small sovereign countries which are not islands: Andorra, Belgium, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Gibraltar, Monaco, Vatican. For the whole world, however, our con-
jecture is confirmed: there are 47 states of less than 14 000 square kilometer, of
which 35 are islands, a proportion of 0.74 (Statesman’s Yearbook 1995).
Historical factors
The model
As has been persuasively argued by Connor (1972, 1994) or Jenkins (1986) history
plays a fundamental role in shaping the collective psychology of peoples. For in-
stance, if a nation has had the status of a sovereign state for a long time it will not
easily accept to be incorporated in an alien state; Lithuania and Poland are illustra-
tive examples. Similarly, if the conquest of a region has required a protracted and
costly war, there is a high likelihood of subsequent rebellions: Algeria, Chechniya
and Ireland are illustrative examples. Even once a nation has been subdued, the aspi-
ration to sovereignty will remain strong for centuries. We shall generalize this kind
of observation by assuming that those attitudes or actions that have been resorted to
several times in the past will tend to repeat themselves in the future. This, in fact, has
become a fairly standard assumption in a number of different contexts as we shall
see now.
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(1) Drawing upon a formidable array of empirical evidence, C. Tilly (1986, p.390)
introduced the conception of a people’s repertoire of action: “Any population has a
limited repertoire of collective action. People tend to act within known limits, to
innovate at the margins of existing forms. People know the general rules of perfor-
mance and vary the performance to meet the purpose at hand.”
(2) In the field of operational research our assumption is embodied in the obser-
vation that, at least in the start-up phase of the learning curve, the completion of a
fairly complex task requires less and less time and effort as it is performed again and
again; typically, it takes only half as much time to perform a task for the 10th time
than it took for the first time (Baloff 1971, Hamblin et al 1973).
(3) In the field of history, it has been showed (Roehner 1993a,b) that the above
principle plays a role in a wide range of historical actions. For the sake of brevity it
has been referred to as the paronymy assumption (collusion and collision, or grada-
tion and graduation are paronymic words). In mathematical terms it can be stated in
the following form:
The probability of a given action is in proportion to the number of its former
occurrences.
In the present study the paronymy assumption will play a dual role: (i) It provides
a guide to the way empirical evidence should be recorded and aggregated; more
specifically, we shall distinguish two periods: 1850-1945 on one hand, 1945-1995
on the other; and we shall examine if there are any similarities in the means used
by separatist movements in those periods. (ii) By comparing the ways of separatist
movements before and after 1945 we shall also be able to test the paronymy assump-
tion. This will be done here in a rather qualitative way by examining three examples;
in the second part of this study such tests are carried out in a more systematic way.
The Bernese Jura in Switzerland
Our analysis relies on two main sources: Jenkins (1986) and Rennwald (1984). Be-
fore and after 1945, separatism from the Bernese canton manifested itself in very
similar ways: petitions, opposition displayed in general elections or in referendums,
occasional outbursts of violence which brought about the deployment of Bernese
troops. The only major innovation in the post-1945 period was the occurrence of
bombing (at least the limited information that we have on the pre-1945 period does
not mention such episodes). That innovation may largely be due to technical reasons
which made bombs easier to store and to handle; this may explain why bombing has
been used by almost all separatist movements in Western Europe. The high degree
of historical continuity may also be emphasized by the fact that the border of the new
Jura canton follows almost exactly the limit between the catholic and the protestant
subregions as recorded in the Treaty of Aarberg of 1711 (Jenkins 1986).
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A similar analysis could be conducted for a number of other regional movements
in industrialized countries: Alsace, Belgium, Brittany, Scotland, Wales. The French
Basque Country and Corsica are to some extent exceptions in the sense that there is
no record of any significant and organized separatist movement between 1850 and
194511Yet, in both regions the forms taken by separatist movements is consistent
with their respective “traditions”: in the Basque Country it relied heavily on reli-
gious feelings and institutions, in Corsica it was channelled by the long-standing
vendetta tradition.
Aceh province (northern Sumatra, Indonesia)
Our analysis relies on two main sources: Cribb (1992) and Zainu’ddin (1968). The
record here is very different from that for the Bernese Jura: warfare and guerilla tac-
tics are the main forms of separatist struggles in the Indonesian province of Aceh.
According to official estimates the thirty-year war (1873–1908)waged by the Acehnese
against the Dutch cost 100,000 deaths on the Acehnese side and 12,000 on the Dutch
side. It is labelled as having been a “ferocious” war although no detailed historical
record seems to be available. A similar pattern occurred once again under Indonesian
(Javanese) occupation. In September 1953, there was an uprising lead by the former
military governor Daud Bereuh. Until 1959 the region remained almost completely
independent from Djakarta. A new separatist uprising broke out in 1990; within a
single year the toll was estimated to about 2300 deaths. In July 1993, “Amnesty Inter-
national” denounced the violation of human rights by the Indonesian army. A similar
analysis could be conducted for a number of other regional movements in developing
countries, for instance: for instance Jolo and Mindanao in the Philippines, the Sikh
separatist movement in India, the struggles for Indian rights in Mexico (Chiapas), in
Peru or in Bolivia. In many of these instances it is difficult to find detailed histori-
cal records for the period before World War II; from the few records that are indeed
available one gets the impression of a strong historical continuity. Yet, it seems that
there also a few exceptions: for instance the Maori struggle in New Zealand has not
resumed the warfare form it assumed in three nineteenth century Maori wars. These
exceptions will be examined more closely in the follow-up paper.
Basque Provinces versus Catalonia (Spain)
This case has captured the imagination of a number of researchers because the
Basque movement is marked by terrorism while political negotiations prevailed in
Catalonia. To explain this contrast several mechanisms have been proposed which
are reviewed in Laitin (1995)12. Let us see if there is a definite answer to this
11These movements can be considered as illustrations of the “demonstration effect” (Connor 1994); they may have
been been triggered by the separatist rebellion in the Spanish Basque Provinces
12Let us emphasize that it would be pointless to propose a specific “explanation” for this single case; even if it turn
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paradox in the general framework of the paronymy assumption. Our contention
is that throughout their recent history Basques were more prone to resort to polit-
ical violence and military solutions than were the Catalans. Let us limit ourselves
to discussing how both peoples reacted to and took part in the many internal con-
flicts that affected Spain during the 19th and 20th centuries. There have been five
main wars: the four so-called Carlist wars (1833-1839, June 1848–April 1849, 1860,
1872–1874) and the Spanish Civil War (1937-1939). Let us examine them in turn.
(1) Barres du Molard (1842) who was Charles V’s chief of staff gave a detailed
account of the battles that have been fought in the First Carlist War (1833–1839).
Out of 63 battles, 59 took place in the Basque Provinces (Navarra included) while 4
took place in Castille. In spite of a substantial amount of social agitation in Catalonia
no battle was fought there.
(2) The Carlist attempts which took place in 1848–1849 and in 1860 were not very
serious ones. In 1848, Alzda took command of the Carlists in the Basque Provinces;
he was captured and shot (Clarke 1906, p.214). At the same time, Cabrera entered
Catalonia through French Cerdagne (June 1848); he spent almost one year there
without any significant fighting taking place; in April 1849 he abandoned hope and
crossed the frontier again. In April 1860, Don Carlos Luis landed with 3,500 troops
near Tortosa (mouth of the river Ebro). But the expected rising did not occur and he
was captured without putting up any resistance.
(3) The protracted war of 1872–1874 was marked by the following major battles:
Orioquieta (Navarra, May 1872), Estella (Basque Provinces, August 1873), Tolosa
(Basque Provinces, November 1873), Vich and Olot (Catalonia, January and March
1874), Teruel and Cuenca (Castille, July 1874), siege of Bilbao and Irun (Basque
Provinces, 1874). Thus, out of 9 battles only 2 took place in Catalonia.
(4) During the Spanish Civil War, the nationalists first subdued the Basque Provinces.
From September 1936 to August 1937 nationalist forces proceeded from East (San
Sebastian) to West (Santander). The campaign that took place in Catalonia (Decem-
ber 1938–February 1939) was one of the last phases of the war and was much shorter
than the struggle in the Basque Provinces 13 .
Broadly speaking, on the basis of the previous historical record, one may say that
the repertoire of the Catalan people, although it included different varieties of gen-
eral strikes, urban uprisings or self-promulgated autonomy proclamations was rather
poorly endowed in terms of stubborn fighting or military upheavals. This may ac-
count for the difference between Basque and Catalan autonomist movements after
out to work in that case, which is assured so to say by construction, it will be nothing but a tautology if it is unable to
explain other cases as well. D. Laitin is well aware of this pitfall since he tests his own model on a second case, namely
the contrast between Georgia and Ukraine.
13The latter is said to have cost 50,000 deaths (Davant 1975); we were unable to find a corresponding figure for the war
in Catalonia.
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1960. Such ways manifested themselves once again in the autonomy movements of
the 1980s.
Conclusion
We have been interested in ethnic revivals based on homeland loyalties and in which
linguistic factors usually play a prominent role. We presented a model aimed at de-
scribing the long-range trend of such phenomena. In a long-term perspective, spatial
and geographical factors turn out to be of cardinal importance. In this paper our
objectives were: (i) To describe the mechanisms we believe to be at work (ii) To
discuss the validity and the implications of the model on some critical examples (iii)
To emphasize that in the emergence of national loyalties there is a strong parallelism
between the role once held by religions and the one languages play nowadays. In
the second part of this paper we examined how and to what extent the historical
legacy determines and shapes nationalist struggles. The present model has a number
of straightforward implications. As an example let us come back to the integration
process in the United States whose strength and effectiveness we emphasized in sec-
tion 1. There are only two countries contiguous to the United States. Canada being
an English-speaking country (with the obvious exception of Quebec) there can be no
major minority problem on the northern frontier. On the basis of history and of lan-
guage quite a different situation would be expected to prevail on the southern border
with Mexico, a surmise which is indeed confirmed by the observation (Lieberson et
al 1975, p.56) that in New Mexico only a small proportion of the Spanish-speaking
people has shifted from Spanish to English since 1846.
In the follow-up paper we shall subject our model to more systematic tests using a
data set based on 40 cases (over the period 1945–1995). Yet, as pointed out by K.
Popper, no finite set of tests can ever validate a theory completely; ultimately, it is
the absence of contradictory evidence which becomes proof of the theory. It is this
very argument which gives its significance to the case studies reported in the present
paper.
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